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HIV-INFECTED HEALTHCARE WORKERS
AND PRACTICE MODIFICATION
JOE ZOPOLSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A significant number of healthcare workers (HCW)I are infected with
HIV.2 Further, "the Centers for Disease Control estimates that ninety per-
cent of HIV-infected Americans are in the workplace. 3 As of June 30,
1997, 19,638 of 9,269,000 HCWs in the United States were reported to be
HIV-positive. 4 In part, this group consisted of 1591 physicians, 105 sur-
geons, 4378 nurses, 428 dental workers, 376 dentists, 2616 technicians, 932
therapists, and 4082 health aids.5 The total number of HIV-positive HCWs
has been estimated to be as high as 86,000.6
The risk of HCW-to-patient infection is relatively low. 7 The risk for
HIV transmission in any given surgery has been estimated to be between
0.24% and 0.024%.8 Surgeons cut or stick themselves, however, in
approximately 6.9% of all surgeries. 9 The cumulative risk that an HIV-
positive surgeon will transmit the virus to a patient at some point in his or
her career has been estimated to be between 0.8% and 8.1%.1o These
estimates, however, are problematic for three reasons: First, the estimates
. Attorney, Henslee, Fowler, Hepworth & Schwartz, Dallas, Texas. B.A., 1996, Emory
University, Atlanta, Georgia; J.D., 2001, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas.
1. "Healthcare worker," is defined in the Texas Health & Safety Code as: "a person who
furnishes health care services in direct patient care situations under a license, certificate, or
registration issued by this state or a person providing direct patient care in the course of a training
or educational program." TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.202(2) (Vernon 2001)
(covering prevention of transmission of HIV and Hepatitis B virus by infected healthcare
workers).
2. See Mara E. Zazali, HIV-Infected Health Care Workers Who Perform Invasive, Exposure-
Prone Procedures: Defining the Risk and Balancing the Interests of Health Care Workers and
Patients, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1000, 1007 (1998).
3. Nancy L. Breur, Emerging Trends for Managing AIDS in the Workplace, 74 PERSONAL J.
125 (1995).
4. Zazali, supra note 2, at 1007.
5. Breur, supra note 3, at 125.
6. Id.
7. Mary E. Chamberland & David M. Bell, Centers for Disease Control, HIV Transmission
from Health Care Worker to Patient: What is the Risk?, 116 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 871,
872 (1992).
8. Id.
9. Jerome I. Tokars et al., Percutaneous Injuries During Surgical Procedures, 267 JAMA
2899, 2900 (1992).
10. Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d. 1261, 1263 (4th Cir. 1995).
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are based on a seven-year period assumed to be the work expectancy of an
HIV-positive surgeon." Second, the number of HCWs who have died as a
result of AIDS is not an accurate reflection of how many HCWs are
infected with HIV.12 Third, the actual number of HIV-positive HCWs is
unidentifiable due to the lack of mandatory HIV testing within the medical
profession.13 However, public fears of acquiring HIV from healthcare
treatment persist. 14
Kimberly Bergalis announced that she had contracted HIV from her
dentist in August 1990.15 In many ways, her case is regarded as the one
which first brought the issue of HIV-positive HCWs to the attention of the
public.16 Before Ms. Bergalis' announcement, fifty-three percent of Ameri-
cans believed that HIV-positive HCWs should be banned from practice.17
After the announcement, estimates approached ninety percent. 18 Further, in
May 1991, a Gallup Poll suggested that eighty-seven percent of Americans
related their support for mandatory HIV testing for doctors and dentists.19
As time has passed and people have become more educated, however, un-
warranted fears of HIV and AIDS have subsided.20 Although seventy per-
cent of Americans considered AIDS the country's worst health problem in
1987, this figure decreased to thirty-seven percent in 1995.21 Further, the
manner in which the public has embraced Earvin "Magic" Johnson in his
struggle with his HIV infection reflects a waning of unwarranted and
unsubstantiated public fears of the disease. 22 Finally, Doe v. Dist. of
Columbia23 serves as an example of a decision in which a court held that all
HIV-positive HCWs are not unqualified to perform their jobs because of
heath risks that they may pose to others.24
11. Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS, Infected Surgeons and Dentists, and the Medical
Profession's Betrayal ofIts Responsibility to Patients, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 73 (1996).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 72.
14. Rebecca Voekler. Public Perceptions of AIDS; Polls: U.S. Understands Risks, but Backs
Testing, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 19, 1991, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. AIDS Victim Blames Policy: Related Developments., WORLD NEWS DIGEST, July 11,
1991, at 516 A2.
19. Karen Garloch, Poll: Doctors with AIDS Should Stop Practicing, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, July 17, 1991, at Al.
20. Susan Brink et al., Beating the Odds: Fending Off the AIDS Virus Isn't Just a Magic
Trick, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 68.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 60.
23. 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992).
24. Doe v. D.C., 796 F. Supp. at 570.
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As one author aptly noted: "The legal profession, the medical profes-
sion, and the public all aspire to the same goal: health care without fear of
contracting [HIV]."25 In order to resolve this dilemma, a variety of poten-
tial solutions have been proposed. These include mandatory HIV testing
and disclosure for HCWs, practice modification, and expert review panel
utilization. In light of the abundance of contradictory and inconsistent
statutory and case law regarding HIV and healthcare, the challenge remains
to deal effectively with HIV-positive HCWs.
This article provides an overview of the issues related to HIV-infected
HCWs and concludes with specific recommendations for employers of
HIV-infected HCWs. Because of the large body of Texas statutory and
case law relating to HIV-infected HCWs, this article frequently uses Texas
law to illustrate these issues.
II. APPLYING THE ADA AND REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 TO
HCWS INFECTED WITH HIV
Regulations prohibiting discrimination in the workplace are specifical-
ly set forth in the United States Code.26 The Code states that "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 27 The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)28 and
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)29 shield certain employees
from unlawful discrimination by employers. Despite similarities between
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the acts are distinguishable since the
25. Anne Whitford Stukes, Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation:
Should Doctors With AIDS Continue to Practice?, 74 N.C. L. REv. 2013, 2035 (1996).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
27. Id.
28. Congress enacted the ADA in 1990. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)). The act
went into effect in July of 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994). In 2001, the Supreme Court
decided Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett which held that individuals are
barred from suing state entities for money damages for failing to comply with Title I of the ADA.
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); see also 42
U.S.C.§§ 12111-12117. However, the Court left open possible remedies for state violations of the
ADA, such as lawsuits brought by the federal government and individual actions for injunctive
relief. Brian Holohan, Disability & ADA: State Sovereign Immunity to Title I of ADA Under
Review-University of Alabama v. Garret, 27 AM. J. L. AND MED. 347 (2001).
29. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 357 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
2002]
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Rehabilitation Act is limited to "programs or activities receiving federal
financial assistance."30
Accordingly, a claim is substantially easier to prove under the ADA.
In order to recover under the ADA, an employee must meet certain require-
ments. 31 An employee may work either part-time or full-time. 32 An em-
ployee may be working within the United States, or in a foreign country. 33
An employee may also be an illegal alien.34 Further, the employee must be
(1) "a qualified individual,"35 and (2) must be "disabled"36 as defined by the
ADA. An individual has a disability under the ADA if he meets one of the
following three criteria: (i) the individual has a physical or mental impair-
ment substantially limiting one or more life activities, (ii) the individual has
a record of such impairment, or (iii) the individual is regarded as having
such an impairment.37 A "major life activity" is one that an average indi-
vidual can perform with little or no difficulty.38 The following factors
determine whether an impairment substantially limits an individual's major
life activity: (i) the nature and severity of the impairment, (ii) the duration
or expected duration of the impairment, and (iii) the permanent or long-term
impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from
the impairment.39
An individual also must show that he or she is "otherwise qualified" to
do his or her job.40 An "otherwise qualified" individual is one who can
perform the "essential" functions of a job, despite his or her alleged
30. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
32. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
33. Id. § 12111(4).
34. THOMAS D. SCHNEID, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR MANAGERS 23 (1992).
35. A "qualified individual" is one who can perform the "essential functions" of a job "with
or without reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). "Essential functions" are duties
that must be performed, and serve as an integral and indispensable part of a job. 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(n)(1) (2001). Factors for determining which functions are essential to a job include the
employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on a job, and the work
experience of past or present employees in similar jobs. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2) & (3). "Disabled
individuals who cannot perform the essential tasks of a job are not qualified." Erika Perrone
Tatum, The Impact of The Americans with Disabilities Act on AIDS Discrimination in the
Workplace, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 623, 633 (1996). If an employer refuses to hire such a
person, the employer is not in violation of the ADA. Id. The act also applies to individuals "with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." Id. at 632; see also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
37. Id. § 12102(2); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).
39. Id. § 1630.20)(2).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994).
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disability.4 1 If an employee serves as a "direct threat" 42 or "significant
risk"43 to the health or safety of others in the performance of the essential
functions of his or her job, he or she is not "otherwise qualified" under the
ADA.44 A disabled person, therefore, is not "otherwise qualified" for a job
if the person poses a "significant risk" to the health or safety of others.45
School Board v. Arline46 articulated four factors for courts to consider in
determining whether a "significant risk" exists:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
(c) the severity of the risk, (what is the potential harm to third
parties), and
(d) the probabilities that the disease will be transmitted and will
cause varying degrees of harm.4 7
The significance of the Arline decision can be appreciated by noting
the fact that its ruling instigated a congressional reaction. Nineteen days
after the decision was rendered, the Rehabilitation Act was amended and
extended to include individuals with contagious diseases.48
An employer must also meet specific requirements. 49 In 1992, the
ADA only applied to those employers with twenty-five or more em-
ployees. 50 In July 1994, the Act was expanded to include employers with
fifteen employees or more.51 The ADA covers all private sector employers
affecting commerce, and all state, local, and territorial governments. 52 In
addition, a "covered entity" includes employment agencies, labor unions,
41. Id.
42. Any individual who has a contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health and safety of other individuals,
or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties
of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994); see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
43. The ADA definition of "direct threat" reinforces the interplay between the terms direct
threat and significant risk; a direct threat is "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of
auxiliary aids or services." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3). Further, in Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
287 n. 16 (1987), the Supreme Court interpreted "direct threat" to mean "significant risk."
44. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 ri.16.
45. Id.
46. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
47. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
48. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(5)(A) (Supp. H 1990).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
52. Id.
2002]
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and joint-labor management committees. 53 An employer under the ADA
also includes agents of the employer such as supervisors and personnel
managers. 54 In reference to the burden of proof, an employee seeking
discrimination relief under the ADA must prove that he or she is "otherwise
qualified," 55 while the employer bears the burden of proving that he or she
is not.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a contagious disease
can, but does not necessarily, constitute a disability.56 This position, in
turn, has given lower courts the power to independently define "disability"
for purposes of the ADA. Accordingly, a case-by-case analysis of the facts
is necessary in order to determine whether or not HIV serves as a disability
under the ADA.57
For example, some courts have held that HIV serves as a disability
under the ADA. A Florida state court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit have held that an individual infected with HIV
is "disabled" due to the adverse impact of the condition on his or her ability
to reproduce.58 In Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co.,59 the court held that an
HIV-positive employee had a physical impairment that substantially limited
the major life activities of reproduction and caring for himself.60 Ac-
cordingly, he was considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA.61
In Abbott v. Bragdon,62 the court held that a dental patient with
asymptomatic HIV was disabled and therefore entitled to the ADA pro-
tection when refused dental treatment because of her HIV-positive status.63
Here, the court found that a woman's asymptomatic HIV status constituted
53. Id. § 12111(2).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
56. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-89. Mitchell Katine, adjunct professor of law at South Texas
College of Law, cautions, however, that it is a "misperception" among the public that HIV is
always considered a disability under the ADA. Meeting Between Mitchell Katine and the Author
(Oct. 20, 2000). In further emphasizing the fallacy of this belief, Katine threatened to penalize the
graded writings of his law students if they advocated the veracity of this particular position. Id.
57. In Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus, & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995),
the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals held that an examination of the facts of an individual
case is necessary in order to determine whether a "disability" exists under the ADA.
58. Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co., 977 F. Supp 1160, 1169 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Abbott v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (1st Cir. 1997).
59. 977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
60. Hernandez, 977 F. Supp. at 1169.
61. Id.
62. 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), remanded, 163 F.3d 87 (1st
Cir. 1998).
63. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 949. On remand, the court held that a "dentist's performance of
cavity-filling procedure on patient did not pose 'direct threat' to others." Abbott, 163 F.3d at 87.
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a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity
because it hindered her ability to reproduce. 64
Similarly, a New Jersey state court, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Fifth Circuit United States Court of
Appeals, and the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals have held
that because an individual infected with HIV serves as a "direct threat" or
"significant risk," he or she is not "otherwise qualified" to perform the
essential duties of his or her job, and is therefore disabled for purposes of
the ADA.65 In Behringer v. Med. Ctr.,66 a New Jersey state court found that
an HIV-positive surgeon posed a "reasonable probability of substantial
harm" because he performed invasive procedures. 67 In Doe v. Washington
Univ.,68 a Missouri district court held that a dental student infected with
HIV was not "otherwise qualified" because he could not meet his credential
requirements without performing invasive procedures. 69 The court based its
holding, in part, on the frequency of self-injury and the potential for
subsequent HIV exposure to patients. 70
In Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp.,71 a Pennsylvania district court held
that a hospital's refusal to allow an HIV-positive surgeon to treat a patient
did not violate the Rehabilitation Act.72 The court elaborated in saying that
the surgeon posed a "significant risk" for three reasons.7 3 First, no cure for
HIV exists. 74 Second, each time the surgeon performs an invasive
procedure, the patient is at risk.75 Third, although people live for years after
exposure, death is inevitable. 76 The court concluded that an HIV-positive
surgeon cannot be "otherwise qualified" under either federal disability
statutes or present medical standards. 77 In Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D.
64. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 934.
65. Behringer v. Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); Doe v.
Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 633 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F.
Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922,
924 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 401 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998).
66. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
67. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283.
68. 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
69. Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. at 633.
70. Id.
71. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
72. Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 772.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 769.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Anderson Cancer Ctr.,78 the Fifth Circuit held that an HIV-positive surgical
technician was not "otherwise qualified" to perform the essential functions
of his job because he posed a risk of transmitting HIV to patients. 79 The
court focused on the probability that Bradley could transmit the disease and
cause harm despite the fact that the risk was small, stating that a
"cognizable risk of permanent duration with lethal consequences suffices to
make a surgical technician ... not 'otherwise qualified."' 80 In In re Mauro
v. Borgess Med. Ctr.,81 the Sixth Circuit held that an HIV-positive surgeon
posed a "direct threat" to himself, other employees, and the local com-
munity. 82 The court deemed it noteworthy that this particular job involved
work with knives and sharp instruments, with the occurrence of cutting and
bleeding being a great potentiality. 83 A surgical technician who is required
to occasionally place his hands on or into a surgical incision and is exposed
to the risk of needle sticks and lacerations, the court reasoned, posed a
"significant risk" to patients.84
In and through Mauro, the Sixth Circuit joins the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits in a novel and potentially disturbing trend. 85 These courts have
manipulated the "Arline standard" regarding significant risk and have trans-
formed a balancing test of relative weights into a narrow inquiry, with the
outcome predetermined by the single factor of HIV infection. 86
Conversely, a District of Columbia district court87 and a Texas court of
appeals 88 have held that an individual infected with HIV does not serve as a
"direct threat" or "significant risk" and that he or she is "otherwise quali-
fied" to perform essential job duties; therefore he or she is not disabled for
78. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
79. Bradley, 3 F.3d at 924.
80. Id.
81. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998).
82. Mauro, 137 F.3d at 401.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Patricia M. Bailey, Significant Risk Concept Justifies Practice Restrictions of an HIV-
Infected Surgeon, 40 VILL. L. REV. 687, 716 (1995).
86. Id.
87. In Doe v. Dist. of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 565 (D.D.C. 1992), a fire department
withdrew an employment offer after discovering that the prospective firefighter was HIV-positive.
Part of the fireman's job description included rendering emergency non-surgical medical
treatment to victims. Id. The court held that the risk that an HIV-positive fireman would transmit
HIV while performing his duties was "extremely remote," and it immediately ordered the
department to reinstate the employee. Id. at 569.
88. In Garcia v. Allen, 28 S.W.3d 587, 587 (Tex. App. 2000), the court held that the
plaintiff's loss of a kneecap did not constitute a "disability" under the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act, because it did not substantially limit a "major life activity." The court found
that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in his ability to work since he was still able to work
in a variety of capacities. Id.
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purposes of the ADA.89 Further, in contrast to the aforementioned First
Circuit and Florida state courts, 90 the Fourth Circuit United States Court of
Appeals held that an asymptomatic, HIV-positive man was not physically
impaired because reproduction did not constitute a major life activity. 9 1
Alternatively, an Illinois Court in Monroe v. Wal-Mart Stores92 held
that it is proper for a jury to determine whether HIV serves as a disability.93
Monroe worked as a "stocker" for Wal-Mart.94 Within two weeks of re-
vealing to a store manager that he had AIDS, a store employee reportedly
informed management that Monroe had made a sexually harassing com-
ment towards him.95 After being reprimanded for his behavior, Monroe
was terminated.96 Since he had stated that he had experienced fatigue due
to AIDS and had fainted on one occasion during his shift, Monroe raised an
issue of fact about whether AIDS substantially limited a major life acti-
vity. 97 Further, Monroe had not received a negative performance evalua-
tion, and therefore he raised an issue of fact as to whether he was perform-
ing at a level that met his employer's expectations. 98 The court denied the
employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that numerous questions
of fact and credibility remained, and that these would best be determined by
a jury.99 The court concluded that it was also a jury question to decide
whether Wal-Mart's stated reason for terminating the employee (for making
sexually harassing comments to a co-worker) was, indeed, the actual reason
for termination. 00 The court also found that the jury should decide whether
HIV served as a disability under the ADA.O1 In short, the jury was to
determine the reasons why a store employee with AIDS was terminated and
whether he was disabled under Title I of the ADA. 102
89. Doe v. Dist. of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. at 565; Garcia, 28 S.W.3d at 587.
90. Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co., 977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Abbott v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
91. Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled on
other grounds by Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
92. 1998 WL 158963 (N.D. I1. 1998).
93. Monroe, 1998 WL 158963, at *5.
94. Id. at *1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *2.
98. ld. at *2, *5.
99. Id. at *5.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Finally, decisions from a Pennsylvania state courtl0 3 and the Fourth
Circuit United States Court of Appeals' 04 suggest a transition from the
"significant risk" standard to an "any risk" standard in determining whether
a disability exists for purposes of the ADA. 105
It has been suggested that HIV discrimination cases be divided into two
categories. The first classification encompasses those cases involving a risk
of transmission that is no greater than that presented by casual contact. 106
Plaintiffs who pose no greater risk of HIV transmission than that presented
by casual contact are likely to prevail under the ADA.107 Conversely,
plaintiffs who pose a risk of HIV transmission greater than that presented
by casual contact, are less likely to prevail. 108
With respect to physicians, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
agrees with the bifurcation of the discrimination analysis in that they advise
against restricting physicians whose procedures are not exposure prone:
"Currently available data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict
the practice of HCWs ... who perform invasive procedures [which are not]
exposure-prone." 109 These particular CDC findings have also been adopted
by the State of Texas in the Health & Safety Code.II0 The Ninth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals decision in Chalk v. United States District
Courtl" typifies employment cases in which the risk of HIV transmission
serves as no more of a risk than that presented by "casual contact."11 2 In
Chalk, the court upheld the legality of a lateral transfer of an HIV-positive
teacher out of the classroom and into an administrative position.113 The
court stated that "there is no evidence of any significant risk to children or
103. In In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991),
aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993), the court held that because a surgical resident performed invasive
procedures and a potential for actual transmission existed, the resident presented a health risk to
his patients.
104. In Doe v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995), the
court held that a hospital could terminate an HIV-positive surgeon based on the threat of transmis-
sion of HIV to patients, although risk was admittedly low.
105. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d at 1290; Maryland Med. Sys., 50 F.3d at 1266.
106. See Stukes, supra note 25, at 2021-22.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTING TRANSMIS-
SION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS AND HEPATITIS B VIRUS TO PATIENTS DURING
EXPOSURE-PRONE INVASIVE PROCEDURE 5 (1991) [hereinafter CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL].
110. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.201 (Vernon 1992) (Subchapter I, Prevention
of Transmission of HIV and Hepatitis B Virus By Infected Health Care Workers).
111. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
112. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 707.
113. Id. at 711-12.
[VOL. 78:77
HIV-INFECTED HCWS & PRACTICE MODIFICATION
to others at the school."'" 4 The court held that "[t]o allow the court to base
its decision on the fear and apprehension of others would frustrate the goals
of [the Rehabilitation Act]."115
The second classification consists of cases involving a risk of
transmission greater than that presented by casual contact. 1 6 The CDC
does not explicitly endorse the unrestricted practice of HIV-positive physi-
cians who perform "exposure-prone procedures."11 7 The Texas Health &
Safety Code defines "exposure-prone procedure" as "a specific invasive
procedure that poses a direct threat and significant risk of transmission of
HIV or hepatitis B virus, as designated by a health professional association
or health facility."118 Notably, some members of the legal community
suggest that settling HIV discrimination cases, rather than litigating, may
serve as an attractive and viable alternative under certain circumstances.1 19
With respect to settling HIV discrimination cases out of court, some legal
authorities encourage negotiated buy-outs. 120 In these cases, individuals
often have the opportunity to leave a job with a sum of money, health
insurance, job reference protection, and anonymity. 121 This strategy might
achieve a desirable result, for example, for an HIV-positive HCW in a small
town. 122
III. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
Under the ADA, an employer must reasonably accommodate a quali-
fied individual with a disability. 123 The United States Code states that the
term "reasonable accommodation" may include the following:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
114. Id. at 711.
115. Id. 711-12.
116. Stukes, supra note 25, at 2022.
117. Id. at 2018.
118. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.202(1).
119. Ann H. Fisher, Law: Health Care Workers With HIV, HIV-Law, accessed at
http://www.Web-Depot.com (last modified Oct. 2, 2000).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A) & (B) (1994).
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qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.12 4
Whether an employer has reasonably accommodated an employee
often serves as an issue of central importance to a particular case. The Fifth
Circuit United States Court of Appeals held that a hospital could not
reasonably accommodate an HIV-positive surgical technician without
"eliminat[ing] the essential function of being in the operative field" and
"such redefinition exceeds reasonable accommodation."1 25 Similarly, the
United States Supreme Court determined that a person "who poses a signifi-
cant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the work-
place" is not "otherwise qualified [to perform the job] if reasonable
accommodation will not eliminate that risk."'126
Scholars have suggested several examples of accommodations in order
to help resolve disputes as to what is considered reasonable.127 Typical
accommodations include: (i) enabling the HIV-positive employee to work
at home with computer equipment, (ii) providing flexible hours, (iii) trans-
ferring the employee to a less physically demanding area of work, and (iv)
allowing co-workers to assist the employee in performing his or her job
functions.128 Finally, it is important to note that reasonable accommoda-
tions are not always mandatory129 and are, at times, of secondary
importance. 130
IV. MANDATORY TESTING
In order to comply with the ADA, an employer may not test an
employee or prospective employee in order to determine whether the
124. Id. § 12111(9).
125. In Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924-25 (1993), the
court held that an HIV-positive surgical technician was not "otherwise qualified" to perform the
essential functions of his job because he posed a risk of transmitting HIV to patients.
126. School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 & n.16 (1987).
127. Michael D. Esposito & Jeffrey E. Meyers, Managing AIDS in the Workplace, 19
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 53, 61 (1993).
128. Id.
129. In situations where an employer is not able to eliminate the risks without altering the
essential functions of the job, the employer is not required to reasonably accommodate. See, e.g.,
Bradley, 3 F.3d at 922 (holding a hospital was unable to eliminate the risk of HIV transmission
without altering the essential functions of the job of a surgeon).
130. For example, employers in Texas are required to determine whether a prospective
employee will be able to perform the essential duties of the job, regardless of accommodations.
Mitchell Katine, HIVIAIDS and the Law: Returning to Work After HIV Disability Leave, 61 TEX.
B.J. 932, 934 (Oct. 1998). Accordingly, from a prospective employer's perspective, reasonable
accommodations are completely immaterial throughout the interview process. Id.
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individual is HIV positive.'31 An employer may also ask an applicant to
prove that he or she has the ability to perform the essential functions of the
job.132 After extending an offer to a prospective employee, an employer
may require a medical examination, provided that it normally does so. 133
These examinations may not, however, be used to disqualify an employee
with a disability.134 At this juncture, an employer is finally permitted to
request and obtain information regarding a prospective employee's
disability from previous employers.135
It is not uncommon for hospitals or employers of HCWs to have poli-
cies and guidelines regarding HIV testing for employees. 136 An Alabama
State Court, the CDC, and the Texas Health & Safety Code all have advo-
cated that such testing serves as a constitutional violation or as an invasion
of privacy. 137 In Hill v. Evans,138 the court held an Alabama statute partial-
ly invalid on equal protection grounds.139 The statute allowed physicians to
perform HIV tests on patients without consent, despite whether invasive
procedures were being performed. 40 The CDC has specifically rejected
mandatory HIV testing policies. 4 1 Dr. William Roper, former director of
the CDC, rationalized the position of the CDC by stating that "[t]he risk for
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (1994); see also 1 Am. with Disabilities Act: Employee
Rts. & Employer Obligations, (MB) § 5.01(1) (2002). For example, Texas does not allow
employers to administer HIV tests for employees unless a bone fide occupational qualification
warrants such a diagnostic examination. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN., § 85.201 (Vernon
2001). HCWs in Texas, incidentally, have filed a class action suit in order to recover costs of
testing and preventative treatment following exposure to HIV in the course of their employment.
An employer may, however, "make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to
perform job-related functions." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (2001).
133. Id. § 1630.14(b).
134. Id. § 1630.14(b)(3); see also Tatum, supra note 35, at 635.
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3)(c).
136. See generally Leckelt v. Bd. of Comn'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
hospital policy requiring HIV testing for HCWs was acceptable); see also CURRENT POL'Y AT
LAKEPOINTE MED. CENTER, ROWLETT, TEX. (on file with author); GUIDELINES FROM
ALVARADO HOSP., CAL.(on file with author); GUIDELINES FROM GULF COAST HosP., BILOXI,
Miss. (on file with author); GUIDELINES FROM MEDICAL CITY DALLAS HosP., TEX. (on file with
author); GUIDELINES FROM METHODIST HOSP. OF DALLAS, TEX. (on file with author);
GUIDELINES FROM PRESBYTERIAN HOSP. OF DALLAS, TEX. (on file with author); GUIDELINES
FROM SANTA ANA HOSP., CAL. (on file with author); GUIDELINES FROM CENTURY CITY HOSP.,
CAL. (on file with author).
137. Hill v. Evans, No. 91-A-626-N, 1993 WL 595676, at *5-*10 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 1993);
see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 109, at 5; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 85.201(a)(4) (Vernon 2001).
138. No. 91-A-626-N, 1993 WL 595676 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 1993).
139. Hill, 1993 WL 595676, at *5-'*10.
140. Id. at *1 n.l.
141. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 109, at 5; see also AIDS Testing Urged
for Doctors, Dentists, HOUSTON CHRON., July 16, 1991, at 3A [hereinafter AIDS Testing Urged
for Doctors, Dentists].
20021
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
doctor-to-patient infection is low. For most procedures, it's absolutely
zero." 142 The CDC guidelines are not legally enforceable, however, since
individual states regulate any and all medical practices therein. 143 Regard-
less, CDC officials stated that they expected the guidelines to impact
healthcare rules and regulations across the country. 144 For example, in
Texas the position of the CDC is reinforced by the Health & Safety Code,
which states that
health care workers who perform exposure-prone procedures
should know their HIV antibody status; health care workers who
perform exposure-prone procedures and who do not have serologic
evidence of immunity to HBV from vaccination or from previous
infection should know their HbsAg status and, if that is positive,
should also know their HbeAg Status.145
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals, Congress,
and the Department of Health and Human Services agree that such a policy
is both desirable and legal. 146 In Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners,147 the
Fifth Circuit Court of the United States upheld the legality of a hospital
policy requiring HIV testing for HCWs.148 The court held that concerns
regarding infection control justified the testing policy, which violated
neither the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, nor the individual
right to privacy.' 49
Congress attempted to enact legislation requiring mandatory testing. 150
The proposed bill would have mandated HIV testing of all HCWs.151 The
bill was named after Kimberly Bergalis, a woman who was infected with
HIV by her dentist.152 United States Senators Bob Dole and Orrin Hatch,
both Republicans, expressed a particular interest in introducing legislation
forcing states to adopt the recommendations of the CDC.153 Health and
Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan stated that "[p]atients deserve
142. Aids Testing Urged for Doctors, Dentists, supra note 141, at 3A.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.201(a)(4) (Vernon 2001).
146. See generally, Leckelt v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Provider Protection Act of 1991, 137 CONG. REC. E2376-02
(daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) [hereinafter Kimberly Bergalis Act];
AIDS Testing Urged for Doctors, Dentists, supra note 141, at 3A.
147. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
148. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 833.
149. Id. at 832-33.
150. Kimberly Bergalis Act, supra note 146.
151. Id.
152. See Voekler, supra note 14, at 2.
153. AIDS Testing Urged for Doctors, Dentists, supra note 141, at 3A.
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accurate information, and they deserve the best measures to protect them
from disease transmission."l 5 4 Regardless and in sum, there seems to be a
general agreement between the legal and medical communities that any
mandate requiring all HCWs to submit to mandatory HIV testing would
serve as nothing more than an impractical overreaction to a more complex
and sophisticated problem. 155
V. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PRACTICE
MODIFICATION
A New Jersey state court, a Pennsylvania state court, Maryland's high-
est state court of appeals, and the Sixth Circuit United States Court of
Appeals have all held that a HCW who is knowingly infected with HIV has
a legal duty to warn. 156 In In re Behringer v. Med. Ctr.,157 the New Jersey
state court held that a patient had a right to know a surgeon's HIV status for
any and all surgical procedures.158 The decision held, notwithstanding
CDC guidelines, which only require informed consent for those procedures
determined to be exposure-prone by a medical expert review panel. 159 In In
re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr.,160 the Pennsylvania state court held that it
was appropriate to disclose the HIV status of a resident after he knowingly
exposed a patient to HIV.161 The incident occurred when the resident
accidentally cut his surgical glove during an invasive procedure.162 In Faya
v. Almaraz,163 a Maryland appellate court applied a negligence standard and
concluded that a physician had a duty to warn his patients because he knew
of his HIV-positive status, and emotional distress to the patient was foresee-
able.164 In EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc.,165 the Sixth Circuit held that
an HIV-positive produce clerk was justly terminated after he disclosed his
154. Id.
155. Calming AIDS Phobia; Legal Implications of the Low Risk of Transmitting HIV in the
Health Care Setting, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 733, 794-96 (Eric N. Richardson & Salvatore J. Russo
eds., 1995).
156. In re Behringer v. Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); In
re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Faya v. Almaraz, 620
A.2d 327, 460-61 (Md. Ct. App. 1993); EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1090-
91 (6th Cir. 1998).
157. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
158. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1255.
159. Id.
160. 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
161. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d at 1302.
162. Id. at 1291.
163. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. Ct. App. 1993).
164. Faya, 620 A.2d at 460-61.
165. 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998).
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HIV status and refused testing.166 Similarly, Congress has advocated man-
datory disclosure by HIV-positive HCWs.167 It proposed a bill that would
have mandated disclosure.168 Congress intended the bill to mandate HIV
testing of all HCWs, and it would have required disclosure by HIV positive
HCWs. 169
Some critics argue that excessive regulation on an HIV-positive sur-
geon is improper.' 70 The dissenting opinion in In re Mauro v. Borges Med.
Ctr.,171 a Sixth Circuit case, stated that the risk of HIV-transmission from
surgeon to patient was not substantial enough to prevent the physician from
practicing medicine.172 The critics also suggest that a physician's right to
practice medicine supercedes a patient's right to be informed of such
status. 173 Allowing a physician to determine whether or not he or she
should disclose his or her HIV status allows the medical community to (at
least be in a position to) serve its own interests rather than, exclusively,
those of patients.174 Further, critics have accused the profession of harbor-
ing a "Don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding the HIV-positive HCWs,
thereby embracing a widespread breach of duty to warn among medical
professionals. 175
The American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Dental
Association (ADA) have recommended that Physicians infected with HIV
refrain from performing invasive procedures.176 The AMA and ADA leave
open the possibility, however, that these procedures may take place, pro-
vided that the patient has been informed and has consented. 177 On January
12, 1991, the CDC recommended that HCWs infected with HIV refrain
from performing invasive procedures.178 After this recommendation, the
Texas Legislature proposed a bill mandating the same, and within two
weeks, it proposed enactment of the findings into state law. 179 In the case
166. Prevo's Family Mkt., 135 F.3d. at 1090-91.
167. Kimberly Bergalis Act, supra note 146.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. In re Mauro v. Borges Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398,401 (6th Cir. 1998).
171. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998).
172. Mauro, 137 F.3d at 410-11 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
173. Mark D. Johnson, HIV Testing of Health Care Workers: Conflict Between the Common
Law and the Centers for Disease Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 531-34 (1993).
174. Id.
175. Closen, supra note 11, at 79.
176. AIDS Testing Urged For Doctors, Dentists, supra note 141, at 3A.
177. Id.
178. Cindy Rugeley & Clay Robison, Plans Merge Agencies, Add AIDS Rules: Infected
Doctors Would Have to Inform Patients, HOUSTON CHRON., July 25, 1991, at Al.
179. ld.
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that a HCW must have his or her practice modified, the Texas Health &
Safety Code sets forth certain regulations which an infected HCW may
follow in his or her attempt to continue to practice medicine to the fullest
extent possible. 180 The Code states:
To promote the continued use of the talents, knowledge, and skills
of a health care worker whose practice is modified because of the
worker's HIV or Hepatitis B status, the worker should: (1) be
provided opportunities to continue patient care activities, if
practicable; and (2) receive career counseling and job retraining. I8
The Code further states:
This subchapter does not: (1) require the revocation of the license,
registration or certification of a health care worker who is infected
with HIV or hepatitis B virus; (2) prohibit a health care worker
who is infected with HIV or hepatitis B virus and who adheres to
universal precautions, as defined by this subchapter, from: (A)
performing procedures not identified as exposure-prone; or (B)
providing health care services in emergency situations. 182
As the ADA and AMA guidelines suggest, HIV-positive HCWs are
able to continue performing exposure-prone procedures despite HIV-posi-
tive status. 183 A dental clinic located in Houston, Texas, for example, em-
ploys HIV-positive dental workers in order to treat HIV-positive patients in
a dental capacity. 184
VI. THE EXPERT REVIEW PANEL PROCESS
The CDC, the Texas Health & Safety Code, and applicable case law set
forth recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of
Expert Review Panels.185 The CDC specifically recommended that an
Expert Review Panel contain "an infectious disease specialist with expertise
in the epidemiology of HIV ... transmission [and] a member of the
[hospital] infection-control committee, preferably an epidemiologist."1 86
180. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.204(d)(1) & (2) (Vernon 2001).
181. Id.
182. Id. § 85.206(1) & (2) (Vernon 2001).
183. The AMA and ADA suggest that these procedures may take place provided that the
patient has been informed and has consented. AIDS Testing Urged For Doctors, Dentists, supra
note 141, at 3A.
184. The Bering Clinic is a dental clinic located in Houston, Texas, where HIV-positive
HCWs have the opportunity to provide dental services to HIV-positive patients.
185. Scott Knox, Laws on Reporting by Seropositive Doctors, HIV-Law@Web-Depot.COM
(Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://www.Hivlegalnyc.orglinks.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
186. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 109.
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Texas' code emphasizes the confidentiality requirement of Expert Review
Panels.187 The code states that "[aill proceedings and communications of
the expert panel are confidential and release of information relating to a
health care worker's HIV status shall comply with Chapter 81."188 The
confidentiality, however, is contingent on the assumption that the commit-
tee acted properly in performing its job functions, and that such actions are
not records maintained in the ordinary course of business.' 89
The purpose of the panels is also treated in the Code.190 "Health
professional associations and health facilities should develop guidelines for
expert review panels and identify exposure-prone procedures, as defined by
this subchapter."'91 The Medical Practice Act states that records or deter-
minations of, or communications to, a medical peer review committee are
not subject to subpoena or discovery.192 These guidelines, however, have
been referred to by physicians as "very general."' 93
In McAllen Methodist Hosp. v. Ramirez, 194 the court held that the Texas
Health & Safety Code section 83.204 provision was more narrow than the
applicable portion of the Medical Practice Act.195 The court justified its
position by stating that the latter applies to all information related to
the panels while the Health & Safety Code exclusively pertains to records
and proceedings.196 The "expert review panels" are also referred to as
"medical committees," "peer review proceedings," and "institutional review
panels."' 97 These procedures, however, are not precisely followed at all
times. 198 In some cases, an HIV-positive physician is required to report his
or her HIV status to a panel of his or her choice.199 In Ohio, for example,
seropositive physicians have the option of reporting their condition to the
Ohio Department of Health or an "institutional review panel." 200 The
187. TEx. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 83.204, 161.032(a) (Vernon 2001).
188. Id. § 83.204(b)(3).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 83.204(b)(4).
191. Id.
192. TEx. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 151.001 to 151.005 (Vernon 2002).
193. Interview with Dr. Paul Zopolsky M.D., President and Medical Director, Digestive
Health Assoc. of Texas (Oct. 29, 2000).
194. 855 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App. 1993).
195. Ramirez, 855 S.W.2d at 200.
196. Id. at 297.
197. Id.; see also Larry A. "Max" Maxwell, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Healthcare Law,
48 SMU L. REV. 1303, 1333 (1995).
198. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995) (allowing
a panel of hospital administrators, rather than epidemiologists, to ban Doe from performing
surgery altogether.)
199. Knox, supra note 185.
200. Id.
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"institutional review panel" option is recommended, since "doctors can
select people who will be realistic about HIV-transmission risks instead of
leaving that decision up to unknown people." 201 In a case where a HCW
fails to comply with the "expert review panel" process, disciplinary
procedures are available. 202 The Texas Health & Safety Code states that
"[a] health care worker who fails to comply with this subchapter is subject
to disciplinary procedures by the appropriate licensing entity." 20 3 In addi-
tion, the Texas Senate has also expressed its approval for the imposition of
penalties on HIV-positive HCWs who fail to disclose HIV status to
patients, including both fines and mandatory incarceration. 204
As expected, HCWs are steadfastly opposed to this type of regu-
lation.205 Brian Bradley, an HIV-positive surgeon whose lawsuit has helped
shaped HIV discrimination law in Texas, typifies the reaction of HCWs to
the bill.206 Bradley stated, "[i]f I thought I posed a risk to a patient, I would
walk away from my job .... I want to continue to contribute to life. It's
essential that I work to do that."207
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO HOSPITALS AND OTHER
EMPLOYERS OF HIV-POSITIVE HCWS
Since hospitals and other employers of HCWs are often the targets of
litigation proceedings, it is in the best interest of such employers to consider
liabilities related to HIV-positive HCWs in order to best protect themselves,
their employees, and the public.20 8 Although the CDC has documented
only six cases of patients who have contracted HIV from a HCW, a signifi-
cant number of HCWs are infected with the HIV virus. 209 Out of a total of
9,269,000 HCWs, 19,638 have been reported as having been infected with
201. Id.
202. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 85.205 (Vernon 2001).
203. Id.
204. Nancy Mathis, Senate Seeks to Force Doctors with Aids to Disclose Illness, HOUSTON
CHRON., July 20, 1991, at Al.
205. Ruth Sorelle, Health Workers Blast Helms Bill, HOUSTON CHRON., July 20, 1991, at
A25.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see also Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir.
1993).
208. See, e.g., Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987). In Stafford, the Texas Supreme Court
allowed damages for mental anguish and lost wages in a suit for actual transmission of a venereal
disease. Id.
209. Zazali, supra note 2, at 1007; see also NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, HEALTH
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE (1997).
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the HIV virus as of June 30, 1997.210 Additionally, potential "infliction of
emotional distress," "fear of AIDS," and "products liability" cases against
hospitals should be noted.211
In Faya v. Almaraz, Maryland's highest state court allowed two
patients to recover for emotional distress after they learned that their
oncologist died of AIDS.212 Here, the court did not require actual exposure
for recovery. 213 Faya goes against the majority of the state cases, however,
which require an actual injury in order to recover. 214 In Marchita v. Long
Island Railroad,215 the Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals al-
lowed Marchita, a railroad worker, to prevail on a claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress for the railroad's failure to provide Marchita with
a safe working environment. 216 The decision was based on Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,217 a United States Supreme Court case in which the
Court concluded that employees can recover for both physical and
emotional injuries if an employer's negligence threatens the employee with
imminent physical impact.2 18 Accordingly, Marchita's potential infection
after a needle stick and resulting emotional distress were held to be
actionable.2 19
Similarly, in In re Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, a New
Jersey state court stated that there is a concern about an HIV-positive plastic
surgeon not "otherwise qualified" to continue to operate because patients
would also suffer stress of post-exposure testing.220 In Twyman v. Twy-
man,221 the Supreme Court of Texas refused to recognize this cause of
action, although the lower courts permitted recovery. 222 Here, a wife sued a
husband for feared exposure to HIV.223 In Drury v. Baptist Memorial
Hospital,224 a patient who received a blood transfusion and feared that he
210. Zazali, supra note 2, at 1007.
211. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993) (infliction of emotional distress);
Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. App. 1990), rev'd, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993)
(fear of AIDS); Riley v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (products liability).
212. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993).
213. Id.
214. See Zazali, supra note 2, at 1038.
215. 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994).
216. Marchita, 31 F.3d at 1200.
217. 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
218. Consol. Rail, 512 U.S. at 549-50; see also Marchita, 31 F.3d at 1197.
219. Marchita, 31 F.3d at 1203.
220. In re Behringer v. Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
221. 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App. 1990), rev'd, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
222. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d at 822.
223. Id.
224. 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App. 1996).
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had contracted HIV sued the treating hospital. 225 When it was proved that
he was never infected, the case was dismissed on summary judgment. 226
Similarly, in Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners, "no fear of AIDS" cause
of action was allowed.227 Here, the United States Court for the Fifth Circuit
held that a licensed practical nurse was not discriminated against solely
because of a perception that he was infected with HIV.228 Although
liability for "fear of AIDS" is generally predicated upon an actual injury in
the form of exposure or infection, the filing of such lawsuits gives rise to
negative publicity for the hospital in question. 229
Riley v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc.,230 serves as an ex-
ample of a products liability action in which the court held that the product
in question was not "unreasonably dangerous." 23 1 The court held that the
product was acceptable since the only comparable alternative was much
more expensive and was not significantly safer.232 Although evidence such
as this suggests biased court rulings in favor of hospitals, 233 hospital
administrators and employers of HCWs should consider and remain famil-
iar with the evolution of such laws, in order that the best interests of the
hospitals, corporations, employees, and the public may be served and
safeguarded to the greatest extent possible. This especially rings true when
225. Drury, 933 S.W.2d at 669-70.
226. Id. at 675.
227. Leckelt v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (E.D. La. 1989).
228. Id. at 1389.
229. Jennifer N. Coffin, Civil Rights Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Americans With
Disabilities Act-HIV-Infected Health Care Workers and the "Direct Threat" Defense, 66 TENN.
L. REV. 311, 327-28 (1998).
230. 913 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
231. Riley, 913 F. Supp. at 894.
232. Id. at 892.
233. The Fourth Circuit's apparent sympathy for hospitals may reflect the court's biased
nature in deciding cases involving hospitals. A possible justification for this action is the fact that
hospitals provide a valuable public service. Stukes, supra note 25, at 2021-31. In Sch. Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987), the Supreme Court mandated a deference "to the reasonable
medical judgments of public health officials." In contrast to the medical community's position, a
New Jersey state court in Behringer held that a patient had a right to know a surgeon's HIV status
for any and all surgical procedures, and that a surgeon has an affirmative duty to disclose his HIV-
positive status to patients. In re Behringer v. Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991). The court rendered this decision regardless of CDC guidelines, which only
require informed consent for those procedures determined by a medical panel to be exposure-
prone. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 109, at 5; see also Stukes, supra note 25, at
2027. All lower courts did not, however, disregard the advice of the Supreme Court. In Doe v.
Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 633 (E.D. Mo. 1991), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri relied on CDC studies regarding the Acer cluster and the likelihood of injury.
The court concluded that substantial deference should be given to the academic decision that the
risk of harm from an HIV-infected dental student was too great. Id. at 634.
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considering the importance of securing and maintaining health insurance for
HIV-positive employees in need of medical treatment is considered. 234
VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to comply with the ADA and minimize unlawful discrimi-
nation due to HIV status, several guidelines have been suggested for em-
ployers of HCWs. First, essential functions of jobs should be specifically
and explicitly defined.235 Second, discriminatory questions on applications
should be eliminated.236 Third, management teams for ADA compliance
should be assembled. 237 Fourth, HIV Education Programs should be
developed and enacted. 238 Fifth, special training should be provided. 239
Sixth, employees refusing to work with HIV-positive persons should be
reprimanded. 240 Finally, employers should review relevant insurance
benefits. 241
With continued education and adherence to the abundance of statutory
and case law regarding discrimination against HIV-positive HCWs, it is
certain that progress will be made towards the collective goal of the legal
profession, the medical profession, and the public, to achieve healthcare
treatment absent all fears of contracting HIV.
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